Despite the European Union’s public commitment to achieving energy independence and systematically halting the procurement of Russian energy resources, statistics compiled for the period spanning January through September 2025 reveal substantial inconsistencies among individual member states. The collective value of natural gas and oil acquired from Russia during this nine-month timeframe amounted to 11.4 billion euros. While this sum marks a 21% reduction compared to the figures recorded during the same period in 2024—suggesting that the overall diversification strategy across the bloc is progressing—the pace is noticeably decelerating.
However, a granular analysis of the data shows that seven EU nations actually increased their energy purchases, calculated in monetary terms, relative to the previous year. Intriguingly, this group includes states that have traditionally been outspoken advocates for robust support for Ukraine. France, for example, saw its acquisitions jump by 40%, reaching a total expenditure of 2.2 billion euros. The Netherlands recorded a significant 72% surge, pushing its spending to 498 million euros. Portugal experienced the most dramatic escalation, registering a staggering 167% increase. Other countries contributing to this upward trend were Croatia (+55%), Romania (+57%), and Belgium (+3%).
The justifications provided for these localized spikes underscore the complex operational and regulatory environment currently facing the EU. The Belgian Energy Ministry explained its import growth by referencing the need to comply with updated sanctions that forbid the re-exportation of pipeline natural gas (PNG). This rule change necessitates storing the gas domestically rather than transferring it onto maritime vessels. French authorities, meanwhile, attributed their increased intake to fulfilling client requirements in neighboring countries, specifically noting the rerouting of some Russian imports toward Germany. This explanation was corroborated by a representative from SEFE, which manages a portion of the German gas transmission network, confirming the receipt of Russian gas via French and Belgian pipelines.
These rising import levels are attracting considerable scrutiny, particularly when juxtaposed with the broader financial context: since 2022, the aggregate import of Russian energy resources into the EU has surpassed 213 billion euros, while financial assistance provided to Ukraine totals 167 billion euros. Experts, including Vaibhav Raghunandan of CREA, have critically described this situation as a “form of self-sabotage,” given that the substantial revenues generated from these energy sales serve to finance military actions. Despite the criticism, EU ambassadors have successfully negotiated a comprehensive plan for the complete cessation of Russian gas and oil imports by 2028, a measure scheduled for final approval on October 20. The framework mandates a ban on signing new gas contracts starting in January 2026 and imposes a full prohibition on all supplies commencing in January 2028.
Nevertheless, the path to implementation is fraught with legal complexities. As highlighted by the Dutch government, current contracts cannot be unilaterally terminated until these proposed restrictions are formally adopted into EU law. Within the scope of a new sanctions package, discussions are advancing regarding the possibility of accelerating the ban on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, potentially moving the deadline forward to January 2027. Conversely, Germany finds itself constrained by existing long-term LNG agreements that lack provisions for early cancellation. Estonia, however, is forging ahead with a resolute approach, having decided to enforce a total prohibition on Russian natural gas imports beginning in 2026. These divergent national strategies reflect the underlying tensions and difficulties inherent in the search for a unified policy amidst a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.